Abettor not to be convicted when principal accused acquitted---When the principal accused is acquitted then it is not proper to make the abettor a scapegoat and convict him on the basis of same evidence.
Right of bail could not be refused to accused merely on account of his alleged abscondance which is a factor relevant only to propriety.
Abscondance of accused--Impact---Mere absconsion of accused is not conclusive proof of guilt of an accused person; it is only a suspicious circumstance against an accused that he was found guilty of the offence which cannot take place of proof---Value of absconsion, therefore, depends on the facts of each case---abscondance is a supporting evidence of the guilt of accused--Absconsion of the accused may be consistent which is to be decided keeping in view overall facts of the case.
|2012 SCMR 522||PLD 2008 SC 298||2008 SCMR 1103|
|2007 SCMR 1549||2005 PLD 270 SC||2003 SCMR 477|
|1995 SCMR 1632||PLJ 1995 SC 477||1992 SCMR 1625|
|1990 SCMR 606||1985 SCMR 382||PLJ 1982 SC 435|
|2011 YLR 540|
Relevance and corroborative value of abscondence cannot be denied on any interpretation of law applicable to it---Strength or weakness, sufficiency or otherwise of abscondence, can be a matter of debate in a given case---Facts of each case will finally determine the place and the weight to be given to abscondence for proving a case beyond reasonable doubt---Antecedents of the absconder, his occupational habits and limitations, period of abscondence and specific explanation for the same, have all to be considered in juxtaposition with the other evidence on the record.
Regarding abscondence of co-accused, it was fact that no' proceedings under Ss.87/88, Cr.P.C. had been initiated against him---Co-accused was behind the bars since his arrest---Even otherwise, refusal of bail on the basis of abscondanceof accused, was a matter of propriety and practice---Accused would become entitled to bail as a matter of right if case of further enquiry was made out and in such an eventuality bail was not granted by way of grace or concession---Commencement of the trial would not debar the Court from granting bail to accused, if case of further inquiry was made out
Mere abscondence of accused which was not proved to judicial satisfaction, would not be enough to warrant conviction, as the factum of abscondence would be a corroboratory piece of evidence and not substantive evidence
|2011 PCrLJ 2||2011 PLD 76||2008 YLR 16|
|2005 PCrLJ 1927||2005 MLD 197||2004 YLR 1240|
|1996 LN (Lah) 623||1995 PCrLJ 167||1995 LN(kar) 74|
|1992 PCrLJ 401||PLD 1989 Lah 554||
Delay in F.I.R.---Conviction under S.302(b), P.P.C. and sentences of death awarded by Trial Court was set aside by High Court and accused was acquitted---Validity---Delay of nine hours in lodging F.I.R. and motive
Trial Court convicted both the accused under S. 302(b), P.P.C. and sentenced one to death while the other to imprisonment for life---High Court allowed the appeal and acquitted both the accused---Three witnesses who furnished ocular account, if had seen the occurrence, nothing prevented them to get the case registered same day, instead they had waited for 2-3 days to have their statements recorded---Presence of prosecution witnesses became further doubtful as none of them accompanied deceased to hospital for postmortem examination---Such quality of ocular account was sought to be corroborated by medical evidence which High Court found to be in conflict with ocular account---Prosecution witnesses in their statements before police stated that deceased was fired upon at his neck but during trial they improved their version and said that it was below the neck---Such reasons being not conjectural or arbitrary and against the weight of evidence on record, thus acquittal of accused was unexceptionable---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the judgment passed by High Court.
Finding of guilt or innocence by police at investigation stage was not a finding in trial culminating in conviction or acquittal and principle of double jeopardy could not be invoked by accused---Even if when an accused was discharged by Magistrate/Trial Court, the consequence was that he was discharged from his bond at a stage when his custody was no longer required by investigating agency---Such order was only an executive order passed at investigating stage when the case had yet to go for trial--- Court could still try the accused, if some fresh material was brought before it---Accused were not discharged by Trial Court and order of their discharge was based on police report and the same could not be equated with acquittal ---Trial Court was not bound by such finding of innocence reflected in final report submitted under S.173, Cr.P.C. and it could still summon the accused---Trial Court having assessed the evidence, came to prima facie conclusion that a case was made out against accused persons and summoned them, which order was upheld by High Court---Prima facie concurrent assessment of evidence (which was preliminary in nature) led by complainant was neither arbitrary nor against the record to warrant interference---Trial Court was to assess evidence which was finally recorded in presence of all accused and consider defence plea, strictly in the light of principles laid down by Supreme Court for safe administration of justice-
Accused had deposited Diyat amount in the court in the shape of Defence Saving Certificates in the names of the three minor legal heirs of the deceased---Major legal heirs of the deceased on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties had forgiven the accused in the name of Almighty Allah and had already sworn affidavits to that effect and they had no objection to the acquittal of accused---Accused were acquitted in circumstances